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 The Guarani Aquifer Agreement and Transboundary Aquifer Law in the 
SADC: Comparing Apples and Oranges? 
 
Francesco Sindico* and Stephanie Hawkins 
 
International law governing transboundary aquifers is considerably underdeveloped, with only 
a handful of bilateral and multilateral agreements governing specific aquifer systems to date. 
However, the significance of transboundary aquifers in addressing water security concerns is 
gaining recognition, and dialogue discussing the future of the international legal framework is 
growing in importance. Contributing to this dialogue, we seek to compare different legal 
instruments applicable to the management of transboundary aquifers in different regions. We 
draw from the experience of the processes that led to an established transboundary agreement 
in one region, and compare it to another region that is yet to establish a formal legal 
instrument. Specifically, we compare the Guarani Aquifer System in Latin America with 
international legal instruments applicable to the management of transboundary aquifers in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). We identify several trends arising from 
the management of the Guarani Aquifer System that could have potentially valuable input for 
SADC countries currently embarking upon the initial stages of the management of a 
transboundary aquifer. Central to this article is the underlying question of whether these 
international legal instruments, which are placed in dramatically different contexts, can be 
compared in the first place. We conclude that such a comparison is useful only if undertaken 
as a process of knowledge acquisition, as such a broad comparative exercise is limited in its 
ability to produce direct policy recommendations. Gaining knowledge of regional governance 
practices in relation to differing aquifer characteristics is particularly important in this 
underdeveloped area, especially as discussions regarding the future for transboundary aquifer 




Can you compare international legal arrangements for transboundary aquifers that are so 
radically different that it could be considered comparing apples to oranges? This article 
addresses this question by focusing on the legal instruments applicable to the management of 
transboundary aquifers in two different regions. The article thus moves away from a more 
traditional comparative law approach in which the laws and policies from different countries 
are compared. Instead, it considers international law instruments applicable to the Guarani 
Aquifer System in Latin America and international legal instruments applicable to the 
management of transboundary aquifers in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). 
 
Such a comparison is challenging, as it involves comparing something that already exists (the 
international legal instrument regarding the management of the Guarani Aquifer System, the 
Guarani Aquifer Agreement) with something that has yet to emerge (there are no international 
legal instruments devoted specifically to the management of a transboundary aquifer system in 
the SADC region). To enable the comparison, the article will look closely at the Guarani 
Aquifer Agreement1 as the ad hoc international legal instrument applicable to the Guarani 
Aquifer System, and a panoply of different regional SADC-related international legal 
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 instruments, which are mainly geared to transboundary surface water bodies. These include the 
SADC Revised Protocol,2 the Orange Senque River Commission (ORASECOM) treaty3 and 
the Limpopo Water Course Commission Agreement (LIMCOM).4 Notwithstanding the 
difficulty of comparing something that already exists to something that is not yet present, we 
hold that a comparison of these regional approaches is valuable for the underdeveloped area of 
transboundary aquifer law, as lessons for the future governance of aquifers in the SADC can 
be drawn from established legal instruments and their surrounding context. The Guarani 
Aquifer Agreement is an ideal point of comparison due, in part, to the presence of donor 
interventions, which are now also becoming prominent in the SADC region in relation to 
transboundary aquifers.5 
 
This comparative exercise will involve the following steps. First, we set the scene by providing 
some contextual information about groundwater and transboundary aquifers. We move on to 
highlight the emerging international law of transboundary aquifers (TBAs) and provide details 
about the Guarani Aquifer System and TBAs in the SADC region. The following sections seek 
to shed some light on emerging practices arising from the management of the Guarani Aquifer 
System with a view to assessing what implications, if any, these practices may have on the 
management of TBAs in the SADC region. Next, we inquire whether a comparative assessment 
of this nature is even possible in the first place, whether it can lead to any policy-relevant 
outcomes and, if so, under what circumstances such a comparative exercise can be replicated 




Groundwater is of crucial importance for global water security. An estimated 96 percent of 
available freshwater resources (excluding water in glaciers and icecaps) are stored 
underground.6 Furthermore, in many parts of the world groundwater is already the main water 
source,7 and in some cases the only source for domestic and other needs.8 Reliance on 
groundwater is set to increase due to further stresses on surface freshwater linked to current 
                                                          
2 Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses in the Southern African Development Community (Windhoek, 7 
$XJXVWLQIRUFH6HSWHPEHU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3 Agreement between the governments of the Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of 
Namibia, and the Republic of South Africa on the Establishment of the Orange-Senqu River Commission 
(Windhoek, 3 November 2000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4 Agreement between the Republic of Botswana, the Republic of Mozambique, the Republic of South Africa and 
the Republic of Zimbabwe on the Establishment of the Limpopo Watercourse Commission (Maputo, 27 
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5 Despite the differences, the two cases seem to follow a similar path towards more formal management of the 
TBAs. In the Guarani Aquifer System, it started with increasing knowledge about a little-understood TBA system, 
brokered partly through international donor projects, and followed by intergovernmental negotiations, ultimately 
leading to an agreement. A similar pattern is emerging in the SADC, with States showing increased interest in 
discussions over their transboundary aquifers as a result of increased knowledge through donor interventions. 
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Fresh Water Resources (Oxford University Press, 1993), 13, at 13. 
7 I.S. Zekster and L.G. Everett, Groundwater Resources of the World and their Use (UNESCO-IHP-VI, 2004). 
8 M. Alker, 7KH 6WDPSULHW $UWHVLDQ $TXLIHU %DVLQ $ &DVH 6WXG\ IRU WKH 5HVHDUFK 3URMHFW µ7UDQVERXQGDU\
Ggroundwater Management in Africa (German Development Institute, 2008); California Water Boards, 
Communities that Rely on a Contaiminated Groundwater Source for Drinking Water: Report to the Legislature 
(State Water Resources Control Board, 2013). 
 climate change trends,9 increased global population10 and unsustainable socio-economic 
patterns.11 
 
When groundwater is stored in an underground geological formation, it is found in an aquifer.12 
When an aquifer is found under the territory of two or more States it is a transboundary aquifer. 
Over the last fifteen years, there has been a huge development in information collected about 
WKH ZRUOG¶V 7%$V ZLWK FXUUHQW HVWLPDWHV SXWWLQJ WKH QXPEHU RI 7%$V DQG JURXQGZDWHU
basins) at around six hundred.13 This is a large number, especially considering that only a 
handful have some sort of legal and institutional setting to regulate how they should be 
managed.14 In some cases these are non-binding soft legal instruments that focus mainly on 
promoting exchange of information,15 and do not enter into any detail about the substantial or 
institutional arrangements for the management of the TBA. In other cases, the TBA is governed 
by a legally binding instrument that provides a very detailed management framework.16 At the 
general international level it has been, again, only in the last decade or so that the international 
community has started to pay attention to the law governing TBAs. This has led the United 
Nations International Law Commission (UN ILC) to adopt Draft Articles on the Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers in 2008.17 Seven years later, the future legal form of these Draft 
                                                          
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of 
Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2014). 
10 7KHSODQHW¶VELRVSKHUHDQGQDWXUDOUHVRXUFHVFDQQRWVXVWDLQWKHFXUUHQWUDWH of population growth. See United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs et al., Population Dynamics in the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda (Report of the Global Thematic Consultation on Population Dynamics, 2013). For impacts of population 
growth on water resources see: M.T. *ULIILQ%(0RQW]DQG-6$UULJRµ(YDOXDWLQJ&OLPDWH&KDQJH,QGXFHG
:DWHU6WUHVV$&DVH6WXG\RIWKH/RZHU&DSH)HDU%DVLQ1&¶Applied Geography (2013), 115; S. Pfister et 
alµ3URMHFWHG:DWHU&RQVXPSWLRQLQ)XWXUH*OREDO$JULFXOWXUH6FHQDULRVDQG5HODWHG,PSDFWV¶Science 
of the Total Environment (2011), 4206. 
11 See IPCC, n. 9 above, at 54. 
12 J. Margat and J. van der Gun, Groundwater around the World: A Geographic Synopsis (CRC Press, 2013). 
13 International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC), Transboundary Aquifers of the World ± the 
Special Edition for the 7 World Water Forum 2015 (IGRAC, 2015). 
14 &RQYHQWLRQ5HODWLYHDOD3URWHFWLRQDO¶8WLOLVDWLRQDOD5HDOLPHQWDWLRQHWDX6XLYLGHOD1DSSH6RXWHUUDLQH
Franco-6XLVVHGX*HQHYRLV *HQHYD'HFHPEHU LQ IRUFH -DQXDU\ µ*HQHYHVH$JUHHPHQW¶
Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above; Agreement between the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the Management and Utilization of the Ground 
Waters in the Al-Sag/Al-Disi Layer (signed 30 April 2015), unofficial English translation by Dr Sami Shubber, 
found at: <http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Disi_Aquifer_Agreement-
(QJOLVKSGI!µ'LVL$TXLIHU$JUHHPHQW¶(VWDEOLVKPHQWRID&RQVXOWDWLRQ0HFKDQLVPIRUWKH1RUWKZHVWHUQ
Sahara Aquifer System (SASS) (Rome, 19-20 December; endorsed 6 January 2003 (Algeria), 15 February 2003 
(Tunisia), 23 February 2003 (Libya)), found at: 
KWWSZZZIDRRUJGRFUHS\H\HKWPEP!µ1:6$6$JUHHPHQW¶3URJUDPPHIRUWKH
Development of a Regional Strategy for the Utilisation of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) ± Terms 
of Reference for the Monitoring and Exchange of Groundwater Information of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer 
6\VWHP 7ULSROL  2FWREHU  IRXQG DW KWWSZZZIDRRUJGRFUHS\H\HKWP! µ16$6
$JUHHPHQW¶ Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a Consultation Mechanism for the 
Integrated Management of the Water Resources of the Iullemeden, Taoudeni/Tanezrouft Aquifer Systems (ITAS) 
(Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria), (2nd Council of Ministers of Gicresait Project, 
Abuja, Nigeria, 28 March, 2014), found at: 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Iullemeden_MOU-SGI! µ,XOOHPHGHQ
$JUHHPHQW¶. 
15 This is the case, for example, for the NSAS Agreement, n. 14 above, and the NWSAS Agreement, n. 14 above. 
16 This is the case for the Genevese Agreement, n. 14 above. 
17 International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (UNGA Resolution 
$5(6'HFHPEHUµ'UDIW$UWLFOHV¶ 
 Articles is still uncertain,18 but they have arguably had some effects, starting with the Guarani 
Aquifer Agreement,19 which was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay in 
2010.20 
 
The Guarani Aquifer System is a TBA system located in Latin America. Despite the recent 
droughts suffered by the state of São Paulo,21 and the increasing pressure on the Guarani 
Aquifer System as a result, this TBA has not suffered great challenges in terms of water 
quantity and water quality.22 However, as the droughts show very clearly, climate change will 
soon put more pressure on the Guarani Aquifer System, creating unprecedented challenges for 
its management. Furthermore, the territory in which the TBA is located is home to more than 
80 million people,23 most of which are based in Brazil. A wide range of socio-economic 
activities, from agro-industry to thermal tourism, is emblematic of the wide use of groundwater 
in the region.24 The aquifer system is one of the largest in the world and estimates suggest the 
amount of freshwater is sufficient to quench the thirst of the global population for the next 
2,000 years at the current levels of consumption.25 Still, some areas of the aquifer are relatively 
unknown,26 with uncertainty as to the exact amount of water contained therein. 
 
Almost twenty TBAs have been mapped in the SADC region.27 However, in contrast to the 
Latin American context, most of the TBAs in the SADC are rather small, and some are 
extremely localized.28 While most of the regions in which the Guarani Aquifer System is 
present are rich in surface water and have decent amounts of rainfall, most regions within the 
SADC are semi-arid with very dry conditions.29 In some cases TBAs underlie deserts, and 
groundwater present in the aquifers is the only freshwater available.30 Moreover, while the 
Guarani Aquifer System is situated in one of the most highly populated areas of Latin America, 
with sprawling cities like São Paulo, the same cannot be said for some TBAs in the SADC. In 
                                                          
18 G.E. Eckstein and F. Sindico, µ7KH/DZRI7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUV0DQ\:D\VRI*RLQJ)RUZDUGE\2QO\
2QH:D\RI6WDQGLQJ6WLOO¶Review of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law (2014), 
32. The Draft Articles may lead to an international treaty, a UN General Assembly declaration of principles or 
remain as they are: draft articles annexed to a UN General Assembly Resolution. 
19 D. 0F5DH µ7KH :RUN RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ ± 3URJUHVV DQG 3URVSHFWV¶ 
American Journal of International Law (2012), 322, at 325. 
20 Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above. The preamble of the Guarani  Aquifer Agreement refers specifically 
WRWKH,/&¶V'UDIt Articles. This is relevant, since the Guarani Aquifer Agreement is only the second international 
legally binding instrument (treaty) adopted on the management of a TBA, the first one being the Genevese 
Agreement, n. 14 above. 
21 -:DWWVµ%UD]LO¶V:RUVW'URXJKWLQ+LVWRU\3URPSWV3URWHVWVDQG%ODFNRXWV¶The Guardian (23 January 2015). 
22 See Project for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development of the Guarani Aquifer System, 
µGuarani Aquifer Strategic Action Programme¶ (2009) µ6$3¶ IRXQG DW KWWSLZOHDUQQHWLZ-
projects/974/reports/strategic-action-program/view>, at 68-75. 
23 S. Foster et al., The Guarani Aquifer Initiative ± Towards Realistic Groundwater Management in a 
Transboundary Context (World Bank, 2009). 
24 L. $PRUHDQG87U|JHUµ7UDQVERXQGDU\*XDUDQL$TXLIHU6\VWHPDQGJURXQGZDWHUPDQDJHPHQWPHFKDQLVPV¶
in: Proceedings of the ISARM 2010 International Conference 6±'HFHPEHU µ7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUV
FKDOOHQJHVDQGQHZGLUHFWLRQV¶ (UNESCO-IAH-UNEP, 2010). 
25 Ibid., at 2. 
26 See S. Foster et al., n. 23 above, at 27. 
27 K. Villholth and Y. Altchenko, Transboundary Aquifer Mapping and Management in Africa (International 
Water Management Institute and Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research, 2014). 
28 SWECO International et al. µ([SODQDWRU\ %URFKXUH IRU WKH 6RXWKHUQ $IULFDn Development Community 
(SADC) Hydrogeological Map and Atlas¶ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), 2009). 
29 Climate change is exacerbating these conditions with downward trends in rainfall and temperature rises. See 
SADC, Climate Change Adaptation in SADC: A Strategy for the Water Sector (SADC, 2011). 
30 See M. Alker, n. 8 above, at 185. 
 VRPHFDVHVWKHSRSXODWLRQµVHUYHG¶E\WKH7%$VLQWKH6$'&LVDOPRVWQHJOLJLEOH31 Whether 
the groundwater contained in the aquifer reaches more or less people, one characteristic of 
TBAs in the SADC is their fragility in the face of increasing climatic changes as well as 
aggressive socio-economic patterns. Climate change is a key challenge for the SADC region 
and groundwater can play an important role in adapting to climate impacts.32 Furthermore, 
several governments in the region have authorized unconventional oil and gas exploration33 
and mining has been a key historical economic activity34 together with (large- and small-scale) 
farming.35 Farming and the extractive industry can be very water-intensive and can also have 
a significant (negative) impact on the quality of the groundwater stored in a TBA. This is 
particularly concerning when ecosystems rely on groundwater to function properly. 
 
The Guarani Aquifer System and TBAs in the SADC thus display different hydrogeological 
and socio-economic characteristics. Acknowledging these differences, the following sections 
of this article will focus on whether any patterns have emerged in the journey leading to the 
adoption of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, which could be of interest for the management of 
TBAs in the SADC region. 
 
THE ELEMENTS TRIGGERING THE GUARANI AQUIFER AGREEMENT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SADC REGION 
 
While the Guarani Aquifer Agreement is one of the few TBA related international treaties, no 
TBA in the SADC is subject to an ad hoc international agreement. This section highlights the 
role of science in the process leading up to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, together with other 
possible elements that could have triggered the agreement itself. 
 
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN THE RUN-UP TO THE GUARANI AQUIFER 
AGREEMENT 
 
In discussing the role of science in the run-up to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, two 
considerations can be made: (i) science as such can sketch a clearer picture of what needs to be 
managed; and (ii) collaborative projects can boost the understanding of a TBA and help build 
political agreement. 
 
First, a better understanding of the science surrounding the Guarani Aquifer System has helped 
GLVSHO VHYHUDO µK\GURP\WKV¶ WKDW ZHUH SRLVRQLQJ GHEDWHV DERXW WUDQVERXQGDU\ ZDWHU
management in the Guarani region before hydrogeologists from the four Guarani Aquifer 
System countries had the chance to clarify the true nature of how aquifers operated. Some 
                                                          
31 W. 6FKHXPDQQDQG0$ONHU µ&RRSHUDWLRQRQ$IULFD¶V7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUV ± &RQFHSWXDO ,GHDV¶
Hydrological Sciences Journal (2009), 793, at 795. 
32 K. 9LOOKROWKµ7KH1HJOHFWHG5ROHRI*URXQGZDWHULQ&OLPDWH&KDQJH$GDSWDWLRQDQG'LVDVWHU5LVN5HGXFWLRQ¶
6 IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science (2009), 292062. See also SADC, n. 29 above. 
33 S. (VWHUKX\VH 0 .HPS DQG 1 5HGHOLQJKX\V µ$VVHVVLQJ WKH ([LVWLQJ .QRZOHGJH %DVH DQG 2SLQLRQV RI
'HFLVLRQ0DNHUVRQWKH5HJXODWLRQDQG0RQLWRULQJRI8QFRQYHQWLRQDO*DV0LQLQJLQ6RXWK$IULFD¶Water 
International (2013), 687; D. Brown, Africa's Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production: 
National Security Implications for the United States and China (Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War 
College Press, 2013); M. Stark et al., International Development of Unconventional Resources: If, Where and 
How Fast? (Accenture, 2014). 
34 %+8VKHUDQG3'9HUPHXOHQµ7KH,PSDFWVRI&RDODQG*ROG0LQLQJRQWKH$VVRFLDWHG:DWHU5HVRXUFHVLQ
6RXWK$IULFD¶LQ<;XDQG%+8VKHUHGVGroundwater Pollution in Africa (Taylor & Francis, 2006), 301. 
35 (%UDXQHDQG<;Xµ*URXQGZDWHU0DQDJHPHQW,VVXHVLQ6RXWKHUQ$IULFD± $Q,:50SHUVSHFWLYH¶
Water SA   .* 9LOOKROWK µ*URXQGZDWHU ,UULJDWLRQ IRU 6PDOOKROGHUV LQ 6XE-Saharan Africa ± A 
Synthesis of Current Knowledge to Guide SustainaEOH2XWFRPHV¶Water International (2013), 369. 
 stakeholders, for example, believed that all the water could be drawn from a single well,36 while 
there was also a widespread belief that the aquifer functioned very much like a large 
underground river.37 Not only were these beliefs refuted (except partly in the case of karstic 
aquifers),38 they were also unhelpful in bringing policy makers together. 
 
It is possible that similar hydromyths exist that need to be washed away in the SADC region 
regarding groundwater and TBAs. For instance, more and better informed scientific research 
could help determine whether countries should proceed to authorize unconventional oil and gas 
exploitation, and what risks such activities pose to groundwater quality and quantity. In contrast 
to what happened in the Guarani Aquifer System, such research may well confirm the 
hydromyth that shale gas exploration and exploitation poses risks to aquifers.39 
 
Second, and very much linked to the first point, the history leading to the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement highlights that international projects can build and strengthen political trust. While 
hydrogeologists from the four Guarani Aquifer countries had exchanged studies and 
information already in the late 1990s,40 it was mainly thanks to the Guarani Project that this 
exchange of information became institutionalized.41 The Guarani Project started in 2003 and 
was completed in 2009 when a Strategic Action Programme was published, capturing the key 
hydrogeological, environmental, socio-economic and legal institutional elements of the TBA.42 
It also provided a series of clear institutional follow ups to sustainably manage the Guarani 
Aquifer System.43 The Guarani Project, which ran from 2003 to 2009, was funded by the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay), and implemented by the Organization of American States. Although it was met with 
scepticism from civil society in its early days due to the presence of foreign consultancies and 
the GEF,44 the Guarani Project has been hailed by many as the turning point in the management 
of the Guarani Aquifer System.45 It was this project that helped build the body of scientific 
knowledge needed to build solid foundations for a possible political agreement between the 
four countries. 
 
Can a similar pattern be observed in the context of the TBAs in the SADC region, with 
international projects bringing together different disciplines and at the same time contributing 
to building the necessary trust between different national decision makers? Slowly, but 
steadily, there seems to be some progress, and international projects are starting to focus not 
only on transboundary surface water, as was once the case,46 but also on transboundary 
                                                          
36 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Freshwater Law and Governance: Global and Regional 
Perspectives for Sustainability (UNEP, 2015), at 95. 
37 Misunderstandings and hydromyths in relation to the Guarani Aquifer mainly existed because of a lack of 
DYDLODEOH NQRZOHGJH 6HH / $PRUH µ7KH *XDUDQL $TXLIHU )URP .QRZOHGJH WR :DWHU 0DQDJHPHQW¶ 
International Journal of Water Resources Development (2012), 463. 
38 See J. Margat and J. van der Gun, n. 12 above. 
39 %3HHN0/HZLVDQG,7HXOLQJµ6KHOO'RQ¶W)UDFNWKH.DURR¶GroundWork, 2014). 
40 J. Taks, El Acuífero Guaraní en Debate (Editorial Cotidiano Mujer, 2009). 
41 See <http://www.oas.org/en/sedi/dsd/IWRM/Past_Projects/Guarani/project_default.asp>. 
42 See SAP, n. 22 above. The Guarani Aquifer Strategic Action Programme was one of the last outcomes of the 
project, and summarizes the main results and key recommendations. 
43 Ibid. 
44 See J. Taks, n. 40 above. 
45 See )6LQGLFR µ7KH*XDUDQL$TXLIHU6\VWHPDQG WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZRI7UDQVERXQGDU\ $TXLIHUV¶ 
International Community Law Review (2011), 255, at µWKHLQFUHDVHLQVFLHQWLILFNQRZOHGJHRIWKH*XDUDQL
Aquifer System is due espeFLDOO\WRWKH*XDUDQL3URMHFW¶ 
46 I. Baum and M. Nierenköther (eds.), Donor Activity in Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: Results of 
a G8-initiated Survey 2004-2007 (GTZ, 2007), found at: <http://www2.gtz.de/dokumente/bib/07-0778.pdf>. 
 aquifers. UNESCO is leading a multidisciplinary project funded by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation, aimed at increasing the understanding of the Stampriet Aquifer, 
shared by Botswana, Namibia and South Africa.47 The aim of this project is for the countries 
to develop an institutional arrangement that will facilitate a coordinated exchange of 
information. The Stampriet project is part of a bigger project that also looks at TBAs in Eurasia 
and in Central America. A second TBA that is currently being studied is the Ramotswa Aquifer, 
shared by Botswana and South Africa. In this case the donor is USAID and the goal is to 
develop a better scientific understanding of the aquifer, but also to promote cooperation 
amongst the two aquifer States.48 In addition, the Ramotswa Aquifer is now one of several 
TBAs that will be studied by a large GEF project in which TBA law and policy constitutes one 
of the work packages. This project will establish a SADC Groundwater Management Institute 
at the University of the Free State in South Africa.49 This institute could play a pivotal role in 
the years to come by boosting awareness of transboundary aquifer management in the region. 
This project follows a completed SADC project that started putting groundwater and TBA 
management more firmly on the map in the context of providing policy responses to droughts 
and climate change.50 
 
The emergence of these international projects is welcome. However, the current approach to 
identifying and developing projects on TBA management is still fragmented. Better 
coordination between implementing agencies and donors could be beneficial for the long-term 
management of TBAs in the SADC, as well as building synergies between already existing 
projects and new developments, such as the establishment of the SADC Groundwater 
Management Institute. The collaboration between actors and stakeholders involved in the 
ongoing Stampriet and Ramotswa projects is promising in this sense. 
 
At the same time, the history of the Guarani Aquifer System shows that civil society and local 
authorities can receive international projects with scepticism.51 In the case of the Guarani 
Aquifer, it was in some cases seen as an intrusion on their national sovereignty, which, at least 
in part, could help explain the strong reference to sovereignty in the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement.52 This reluctance to accept the involvement international donors seems to be less 
of a problem in the SADC region. However, projects need to engage constructively with local 
and regional stakeholders and decision makers in order for countries and users to feel not only 
represented, but also to consider it worthwhile to follow up and take ownership of these projects 
once they are completed. 
 
In conclusion, science played a key role in furthering international cooperation on TBA 
management in the case of the Guarani Aquifer System. On the one hand, it could be argued 
                                                          
47 The Groundwater Resources Governance in Transboundary Aquifers Project (GGRETA), found at: 
KWWSZZZJURXQGZDWHUFRSLZOHDUQQHWJJUHWD!µ**5(7$3URMHFW¶ 
48 This project is menWLRQHGLQD**5(7$3URMHFWPHHWLQJUHSRUW**5(7$3URMHFWµ*URXQGZDWHU5HVRXUFHV
Governance in Transboundary Aquifers, Kalahari-.DURR 6WDPSULHW $TXLIHU 5HSRUW )LUVW 5HJLRQDO 0HHWLQJ¶
(UN House, Windhoek, Namibia 22-24 October 2013), found at: 
<http://groundwatercop.iwlearn.net/ggreta/2_StamprietFirstMeetingReport.pdf>, at 10. 
49 P. 5DPRHOLDQG/&URQHERUJµ6XVWDLQDEOH*URXQGZDWHU0DQDJHPHQWLQ6$'&0HPEHU6WDWHV3URMHFW%ULHI¶
(SADC et al., 2013). 
50 6$'&µ*URXQGZDWHUDQG'URXJKW0DQDJHPHQW3URMHFW¶found at: <http://iwlearn.net/iw-projects/970>. 
51 See J. Taks, n. 40 above. 
52 See F. Sindico, n. 45 above, at 260-262; L. 'HO&DVWLOOR/DERUGHµ7KH/DZRI7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUVDQGWKH
%HUOLQ 5XOHV RQ :DWHU 5HVRXUFHV ,/$ ,QWHUSUHWLYH &RPSOHPHQWDULW\¶ LQ Proceedings of the ISARM 2010 
International Conference 6± 'HFHPEHU  µ7UDQVERXQGDU\ $TXLIHUV FKDOOHQJHV DQG QHZ GLUHFWLRQV¶ 
(UNESCO-IAH-UNEP, 2010). 
 that until the countries know what they are regulating they should not move forward with 
transboundary cooperation. On the other hand, the opposite could be also true, and possibly 
more convincing. Precisely because of the scientific uncertainty about the nature of an aquifer, 
countries should be encouraged to leave aside their differences and consider joint management 
practices aimed at increasing their level of understanding of the aquifer through joint studies 
and exchanges of information.53 The example of the Guarani Aquifer System may fall within 
the first category (transboundary cooperation following an increased scientific understanding 
of the aquifer),54 while TBA management in the SADC fits more comfortably in the latter 
(transboundary cooperation despite a lack of thorough scientific understanding). 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW GUIDELINES, WATER CONFLICTS AND NATIONAL 
WATER LAW IN THE RUN-UP TO THE GUARANI AQUIFER AGREEMENT 
 
We now turn to the other elements that can be said to have triggered the 2010 Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement. These elements include an adequate scientific understanding of the aquifer, the 
availability of general guidelines in international law, and an end to a long-lasting political 
tension in the region over transboundary water resources.55 To these we can add a fourth 
element: the existence of mature domestic legal and regulatory systems for groundwater 
management. 
 
Let us consider each one of these factors more closely to see whether there are any similarities 
for the case of the SADC region. We have already mentioned how the work of researchers in 
the Guarani region, together with the outcomes of the Guarani Project, had enhanced the level 
of scientific understanding of the aquifer. We have also shown that a network of projects is 
emerging in the SADC region. 
 
Moving on to considerations of the presence of general international law guidelines, it can be 
noted that in the case of the Guarani Aquifer System, countries attempted to negotiate a treaty 
to put forward the main rules and institutions for the management of the TBA in 2005, but 
failed. Two elements that had changed when the agreement was signed in 2010 were the new 
ILC¶s Draft Articles and the end of the Pulp Mills dispute.56 In the SADC region, one can see 
in the TBA-related project documents and in some SADC water policy documents references 
WRWKH,/&¶V'UDIW$UWLFOHV57 7KHODWWHUDUHQRZDFNQRZOHGJHGDVDSRVVLEOHµJXLGDQFH¶IRUWKH
future management of transboundary aquifers.58 This is important, because it means that once 
regional stakeholders and decision makers start to consider the regulation and management of 
transboundary aquifers, they can avail of UN-endorsed guidelines. Whether the end of the Pulp 
                                                          
53 The Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers recognize this in Article 8; see Draft Articles, n. 17 
above. The Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above, refers to this in Article 12. 
54 With the caveat that even for the Guarani Aquifer System there are still plenty of areas (especially in Argentina 
where the aquifer is deeper) where knowledge of the aquifer is still very limited. See S. Foster et al. n. 23 above, 
at 27; Z.P. Sugg et al. µ7UDQVERXQGDU\*URXQGZDWHU*RYHUQDQFH LQ WKH*XDUDQL$TXLIHU6\VWHP5HIOHFWLRQV
IURPD6XUYH\RI*OREDODQG5HJLRQDO([SHUWV¶40:3 Water International (2015), 377. 
55 See F. Sindico, n. 45 above. 
56 ICJ 20 April 2010, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), [2010] ICJ Rep. 14 µPulp Mills¶
The Pulp Mills Dispute was an environmental dispute between Argentina and Uruguay (two countries also sharing 
the Guarani Aquifer system) over the construction of pulp plant mills on the Uruguayan side of the River Uruguay 
that flows between the two countries. 
57 See GGRETA Project, n. 47 above, at 10; G. Christelis et al.µTowards Transboundary Aquifer management 
in Southern Africa¶ LQ Proceedings of the ISARM 2010 International Conference 6±8 December 2010 
µ7UDQVERXQGDU\Aquifers: Challenges and New Directions (UNESCO-IAH-UNEP, 2010). 
58 Report of the Sixth Committee, The Law of Transboundary Aquifers (UN Doc. A/68/470, 19 November 2013), 
at paragraph 1; see G.E. Eckstein and F. Sindico, n. 18 above, at 34-35. 
 Mills dispute between Uruguay and Argentina really played a role in adopting the Guarani 
Aquifer Agreement is a matter of speculation.59 
 
Finally, one of the conclusions of the Guarani Project was that, although not perfect, the 
domestic legal systems of the four countries sharing the Guarani Aquifer System was mature 
and well-positioned to deal with groundwater challenges.60 If and when the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement enters into force,61 the alleged maturity of the domestic legal systems will play an 
important role in the implementation of the agreement.62 The SADC shows an interesting 
picture in this respect, with some countries possessing laws that are not just mature, but quite 
progressive in terms of water resources management, with the laws hailed as models for other 
countries. Namibia, for example, possesses specific sections on groundwater management in 
its Water Act, and at an institutional level it provides the possibility of creating basin authorities 
focusing on specific hydrology and hydrogeological features of its water resources, including 
aquifers.63 The SADC region also includes countries (e.g. Zambia), whose water laws refer 
directly to international water law principles.64 Consequently, if there is to be an agreement 
between countries within the SADC region on the management of a transboundary aquifer, 
such an agreement would be embedded in existing national legal, regulatory and institutional 
frameworks. As in the Guarani Aquifer System, most countries have a mature domestic legal 
system that would be capable of providing (at least in writing) the necessary legal and 
regulatory tools for the implementation of the transboundary agreement. 
 
Furthermore, the SADC region already has put in place a large number of transboundary 
surface water agreements and institutions that could prove useful when considering the 
management of TBAs in the region. We will address this point in the next section. 
 
A DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF THE GUARANI AGREEMENT: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE SADC REGION 
 
This section will highlight a few key characteristics emerging from a doctrinal analysis65 of the 
Guarani Aquifer Agreement. As we will explain further below, we do not suggest that other 
regions, including the SADC, should look to the Guarani experience as a model. There is, 
however, merit in sharing practices and experiences. 
 
THE GUARANI AQUIFER AGREEMENT EXPERIENCE 
                                                          
59 Pulp Mills, n. 56 above; see F. Sindico, n. 45 above, at 260. It has also been speculated that the agreement was 
the result of concern by stakeholders on the local level that future conflicts may arise between the countries; see 
Z.P. Sugg et al., n. 54 above, at 391. 
60 See SAP, n. 22 above, at 105-106. See the national water legislation in the Guarani Aquifer System region: 
Argentina General Environmental Law 25.675; Argentina Environmental management of Water Law 25.688; 
Paraguay Law on Water Resources, Law 3239 of 10 July 2000; Brazil National Water Resources Policy, Law no. 
9.433 of 1997; Uruguay Water Code 1978 (as amended in 1987 and 1991).  
61 The Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above, still needs the ratifications of Brazil and Paraguay, having been 
ratified only by Uruguay and Argentina as of 18 June 2015. 
62 See S. %XUFKLµ$&RPSDUDWLYH5HYLHZRI&RQWHPSRUDU\:DWHU5HVRXUFHV/HJLVODWLRQ7UHQGV'HYHORSPHQWV
DQGDQ$JHQGDIRU5HIRUP¶Water International (2012), 613. 
63 Namibia Water Resources Management Act, 2004 (Act No.24 of 2004); see also S. Burchi, n. 62 above. 
64 Zambia Water Resources Management Act, 2011 (Act No.21 of 2011). The authors would like to thank Stefano 
Burchi for pointing this out to them during an international water law training programme held in Gaborone, 
Botswana, in May 2015. 
65 %\GRFWULQDODQDO\VLVZHUHIHUWRWKHµDWWHPSWWRGHWHUPLQHZKDWWKHOHJDOQRUPVDUHDQGKRZWKRVHQRUPVDSSO\
WRSDUWLFXODUVLWXDWLRQV¶; D. Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (Harvard University 
Press, 2009), at 5. 
  
The first two features to highlight refer to the nature of the provisions in the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement; the other two characteristics refer to the institutional options for the further 
operationalization of the Agreement. 
 
The Guarani Aquifer Agreement is very general, but can be seen as very specific in some 
respects. It is general because it provides a flexible framework for cooperation. Most of the 
provisions are not particularly detailed, and the Agreement can best be viewed as a starting 
point, rather than a place in which all the answers can be found to any management question. 
Firmly rooted in the principle of sovereignty over natural resources,66 but balanced by a direct 
reference to other general applicable rules of international law,67 the Agreement contains most 
of the key substantive and procedural obligations present in modern international water law. 
The four Guarani Aquifer System countries are required to: use the aquifer in order to ensure 
µmultiple, reasonable, sustainable, and equitable use of its water resources¶68 not cause 
significant harm to their neighbouring States;69 provide prior notification should planned 
activities be likely to cause effects to parts of the aquifer beyond their borders;70 exchange 
information about the aquifer;71 and protect the aquifer.72 
 
While these provisions are framed in rather general terms that require (as is usually the case) 
some degree of interpretation and application based on the circumstances of each utilization of 
the aquifer, there is another provision that is more specific. Article 14 of the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement foresees the possibility that the Guarani Aquifer System countries identify µcritical 
areas¶ (where pollution or overexploitation of groundwater is more problematic) and adopt 
special measures for the management of such areas. The provision does not explain what kind 
of measures are envisaged; this will depend on the nature of the area of the aquifer and the 
nature of the threats to the aquifer in such an area. An example of what this could look like 
comes from a very recent development in TBA law and policy, namely the agreement between 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the Disi Aquifer.73 In this case, the agreement establishes both a 
restricted protection and management area in which activities on the aquifer are limited.74 
Returning to the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, the relevance of Article 14 is that it provides 
legal grounds for the adoption of specific measures by the future institution that will govern 
and manage the Guarani Aquifer System. This provision, requiring specific action for special 
parts of the aquifer, arguably stems from the experience with two transboundary pilot projects 
                                                          
66 Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above, preamble and Articles 2-3. 
67 Ibid., Article 2. The debate over sovereignty has sparked a lot of debate in the literature; see S.C. McCaffrey, 
µ7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ&RPPLVVLRQ¶VIODZHG Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers: The Way 
)RUZDUG¶  Water International (2011), 566; O. 0F,QW\UH µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO :DWHU 5HVRXUFHV /DZ DQG WKH
International Law Commission Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers: A Missed Opportunity for Cross-
)HUWLOLVDWLRQ"¶  International Community Law Review (2011), 237; G.E. (FNVWHLQ µ0DQDJLQJ %XULHG
7UHDVXUHDFURVV)URQWLHUV7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZRI7UDQVERXQGDU\$TXLIHUV¶Water International (2011), 
573. 
68 Guarani Aquifer Agreement, n. 1 above, Article 4. 
69 Ibid., Article 3. 
70 Ibid., Article 9. 
71 Ibid., Articles 8-12. 
72 Ibid., Article 4. 
73 Disi Aquifer Agreement, n. 14 above. 
74 Ibid., Article 2.1, requires µ[t]he elimination of all activities in the Protected Area (the Prohibited Area)¶ and 
Article 2.5 mandates µ[t]he protection of groundwater in the Management Area between the two States from any 
pollution. It is not permissible to inject any pollutant, whatever its quality or quantity, into the groundwaters in 
the Management Area¶. 
 undertaken in the Guarani project that underscored the importance of cooperation in a more 
localized part of the aquifer, where the pressures are more urgent.75 
 
Accordingly, it is necessary to explore the possible institutions that will be tasked to manage 
the aquifer. Article 15 of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement makes it very clear that a Commission 
charged with the management of the Guarani Aquifer System will be established under the 
framework of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin.76 The option that has been agreed is to link 
a transboundary agreement with an already established legal and institutional framework whose 
main competence is to deal with transboundary surface water. The other option was to leave 
the two separated, and to create an ad hoc institutional framework devoted solely to the 
management of the Guarani Aquifer System. Considerations of efficiency argued against an ad 
hoc institutional system. Interestingly, the membership of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin 
does not overlap completely with the countries sharing the Guarani Aquifer System, since 
Bolivia is also part of the Treaty of the River Plate Basin. Nonetheless, this was no impediment 
to specifying a role for the Treaty of the River Plate Basin Commission in the management of 
the aquifer. One interesting development is that, if and when the Agreement enters into force, 
the Commission under Article 15 of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement may become the 
institution in charge for the management not just of the Guarani Aquifer System, but also for 
other TBAs that can be found beneath the Plate Basin, which are currently being studied in a 
further GEF project.77 
 
Finally, the Guarani Aquifer Agreement lacks a clear dispute settlement provision. In the 2005 
draft agreement that was being negotiated, such a provision was present, together with a 
detailed annex elaborating how arbitration should take place.78 This provision was deleted, and 
this is where the speculation can begin. Has this triggered the adoption of the Guarani Aquifer 
Agreement? It could be argued that the dispute settlement provision proved too controversial 
and undermined the entire negotiations that took place in 2005. When these resumed in 2010, 
and this provision and the annex were deleted, the four countries reached agreement rather 
quickly.79 Whatever interpretation is correct, the absence of a dispute settlement provision in 
the Guarani Aquifer Agreement may prove challenging should countries disagree on the 
interpretation of any specific provision. 
 
EMERGING TBA GOVERNANCE IN THE SADC REGION 
 
While the region lacks ad hoc arrangements for transboundary aquifers, there is a wealth of 
experience in the SADC in the field of transboundary surface water law and policy. At the 
regional level, the 2000 SADC Revised Protocol very closely follows the guidelines set out in 
the United Nations Watercourses Convention.80 The Protocol encourages countries to negotiate 
separate agreements over transboundary watercourses in the region and to create institutions to 
manage such treaties.81 Currently, there are up to 15 shared river basins in the SADC but only 
                                                          
75 See SAP, n. 22 above. 
76 Treaty of the River Plate Basin (Brasilia, 23 April 1969; in force 14 August 1970) (Agreement between Brazil, 
Argentina, Bolivia Paraguay and Uruguay); see also Z.P. Sugg et al., n. 54 above. 
77 7KH*()SURMHFWLVWLWOHGµ6XVWDLQDEOH0DQDJHPHQWRIWKH:DWHU5HVRXUFHVRIWKH/D3ODWD%DVLQZLWK5HVSHFW
to the Effects of Climate Variability and &KDQJH¶SURMHFW,'VHHKWWSLZOHDUQQHWLZ-projects/2095>. 
78 On file with authors. 
79 See F. Sindico, n. 45 above. 
80 SADC Revised Protocol, n. 2 above; see UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (New York, 21 May 1997; in force 17 August 2014) µ81:DWHUFRXUVHV&RQYHQWLRQ¶ 
81 Ibid., Article 5. 
 six of these have a dedicated commission.82 This existing institutional framework is therefore 
considered in the absence of an aquifer specific agreement, with a view to identifying emerging 
trends towards TBA governance in the region. 
 
If the institutional option chosen for the Guarani Aquifer Agreement ± linking the management 
of a TBA to that of a transboundary river basin ± were to be followed in the SADC region, this 
option could fit comfortably with the wider transboundary water governance landscape in the 
SADC. In fact, policy makers in the SADC have called for this specifically,83 mentioning that 
the emerging attention for TBAs should be linked to already existing transboundary river 
commissions. If that were the case, the two TBAs that appear to have gathered some 
momentum in terms of international project activities, the Stampriet and the Ramotswa, could 
fall under the mandate of ORASECOM and LIMCOM treaties respectively. Interestingly, as 
is the case for the Treaty of the River Plate Basin, there are countries that would not have a 
direct interest in the management of the TBA. Similarly to Bolivia in the case of the Guarani 
Aquifer System, this would include Lesotho in the case of the Stampriet, and Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe in the case of the Ramotswa, since they would not share the TBA in question. 
However, this would not be an obstacle since both the ORASECOM and LIMOCOM treaties 
refer to the possibility for specific parties to enter into ad hoc agreements.84 
 
If the countries sharing the Stampriet or the Ramotswa were to consider the ORASECOM and 
LIMCOM treaties and their commissions to manage the specific TBA, the question arises as to 
whether these agreements already cover groundwater and, potentially, transboundary aquifers. 
This is the case for the LIMCOM treaty, which defines the Limpopo watercourse as a system 
of surface and groundwaters of the Limpopo.85 Conversely, the ORASECOM treaty does not 
define µriver system¶, and merely includes a brief reference to the µhydrogeological¶ condition 
of the river system,86 which could imply that groundwater connected to surface water is 
included in the system itself. On the other hand, especially in its provisions about the obligation 
of the parties, the ORASECOM treaty goes into great lengths to discuss obligations in relation 
to specific parts of the river system, such as the estuary.87 While the analysis so far does not 
seem to lean towards the inclusion of groundwater in the work of ORASECOM, a closer look 
at the preamble suggests that it does so indirectly through the reference to the United Nations 
Watercourses Convention.88 The preamble also refers to the fact that ORASECOM has been 
inspired by the SADC Revised Protocol. The latter does include a definition of µwatercourse¶ 
that resembles the one provided for in the United Nations Watercourses Convention, which 
includes groundwater inasmuch as it is connected to surface water.89 More convincingly than 
the treaty itself, the structure that has been devised by the parties for its functioning reveals that 
                                                          
82 These are the Commission Internationale du Bassin Congo-Oubangui-Sangha, the Permanent Joint Technical 
Committee Kunene, the Limpopo Watercourse Commission, the Permanent Okavango River Basin Water 
Commission, the Orange-Senqu River Commission and The Zambezi Watercourse Commission. See SADC, 
µ:DWHU,QIRUPDWLRQ6HUYLFHVDQG3RUWDOV¶IRXQGDWKWWSZZZVDGFLQWWKHPHVQDWXUDO-resources/water/>. 
83 3%HHWOHVWRQHDQG(%UDXQHµGroundwater in the SADC Integrated Water Resources Management Initiative: 
Workshop Report, 18-1RYHPEHU%RWVZDQD¶6$'& 
84 ORASECOM Treaty, n. 3 above, Article 1.4; LIMCOM Treaty, n. 4 above, Article 2.5. 
85 LIMCOM Treaty, n. 4 above, Article 1.2. 
86 Ibid., Article 7.4. 
87 Ibid., Article 7.14. 
88 UN Watercourses Convention, n. 80 above, $UWLFOHDµ³:DWHUFRXUVH´PHDQVDV\VWHPRIVXUIDFHZDWHUVDQG
groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a 
common tHUPLQXV¶ 
89 SADC Revised Protocol, n. 2 aERYH $UWLFOH  µ:DWHUFRXUVH V\VWHP PHDQV WKH LQWHU-related hydrologic 
components of a drainage basin such as streams, rivers, lakes, canals and underground water which constitute a 
XQLWDU\ZKROHE\YLUWXHRIWKHLUSK\VLFDOUHODWLRQVKLS¶ 
 ORASECOM is mandated to deal with groundwater-related matters. In fact, in addition to a 
decision-making body (Council) and an administrative body (Secretariat), there are four 
Technical Task Teams, one of which includes a µHydrogeology Committee¶.90 
 
While other transboundary river agreements in the SADC may provide for a clearer mandate 
for groundwater and, potentially, transboundary aquifers,91 the ORASECOM and LIMCOM 
can be used as institutions for the future management of the two specific TBAs. However, the 
treaties and most of the institutional structures created by them are geared towards 
transboundary surface water. Where rules do consider groundwater, the agreements certainly 
do not provide for holistic management of the aquifer system, as opposed to just the water 
contained therein. If the ORASECOM and LIMCOM treaties and their respective commissions 
are to play any role in the management of TBAs, tailored rules should be carefully considered. 
Whether the characteristic differences between these aquifers and the wider river basins in 
which they are situated warrant completely separate and aquifer-specific legal agreements (as 
in the case of the Guarani Aquifer Agreement), is yet to be seen. What is more important at 
this point is that SADC countries are warming to the idea that regional water policy is not just 
about surface water and transboundary river agreements, but requires also attention to TBAs 
and their management. 
 
Unlike the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, the institutional arrangements in the SADC offer 
detailed dispute mechanisms, although their practical applicability is tenuous. The overarching 
6$'&5HYLVHG3URWRFROVWDWHVWKDWWKHSDUWLHVµVKDOOVWULYHWRUHVROYHDOOGLVSXWHVUHJDUGLng the 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RU DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH SURYLVLRQV RI WKLV 3URWRFRO DPLFDEO\¶, 
ZKLOHGLVSXWHVµZKLFKDUHQRWVHWWOHGDPLFDEO\VKDOOEHUHIHUUHGWRWKH[SADC] 7ULEXQDO¶.92 In 
addition, both the ORASECOM and LIMCOM treaties provide detailed dispute resolution 
provisions with time limits, which also defer to the authority of the SADC Tribunal.93 However, 
the SADC Tribunal has been suspended since 2012, once again demonstrating that such 
mechanisms are severely limited by the principle of State consent.94 The disbanding of the 
SADC Tribunal also illuminates the fact that the establishment of such mechanisms is by no 
means future-proof. While the implementation challenge for the Guarani Aquifer Agreement 
can be characterized by the absence of dispute settlement provisions in the Agreement itself, 
the obstacles for the SADC region lie in the failure of regional mechanisms, in spite of the 
existence of thorough legal provisions. It may therefore be useful to consider the cooperative 
environment at local level µKRWVSRWV¶LQFDVHVZKHUHState relations prove problematic. 
 
Similar to the Guarani Aquifer, the need for groundwater management to be decentralized to 
various local hotspots has been identified in the SADC region.95 Despite this, the existing 
agreements remain relatively State-centric in their approach to cooperation. Although the 
LIMCOM and ORASECOM treaties acknowledge local issues through provisions requiring 
                                                          
90 See <http://www.orasecom.org/about/structure.aspx>. 
91 Agreement on the Establishment of the Zambesi Watercourse Commission (Kasane, Botswana, 13 July 2004; 
in force 26 June 2011), $UWLFOHµ=DPEHVL:DWHUFRXUVHPHDQVWKHV\VWHPRIVXUIDFHDQGJURXQGZDWHUVRIWKH
Zambesi constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole flowing normally into a common 
WHUPLQXVWKH,QGLDQ2FHDQ¶ 
92 SADC Revised Protocol, n. 2 above, Article 7. 
93 ORASECOM Treaty, n. 3 above, Article 8; LIMCOM Treaty, n. 4 above, Article 9. 
94 L. 1DWKDQµ7KH'LVEDQGLQJRIWKH6$'&7ULEXQDO$&DXWLRQDU\7DOH¶Human Rights Quarterly (2013), 
870. 
95 W. 6FKHXPDQQ DQG ( +HUUIDKUGW µ&RQFHSWXDOL]LQJ CRRSHUDWLRQ RQ $IULFD¶V Transboundary Groundwater 
RHVRXUFHV¶*HUPDQ'HYHORSPHQW,QVWLWXWH. 
 public participation,96 these provisions do not detail how this should be achieved, and there 
remains a lack of formal transboundary arrangements enabling localized cooperation for TBAs 
at the border. However, opportunities for local cooperation exist in areas with transnational 
parks. For example, the Stampriet Aquifer underlies the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park, for 
which a joint management committee exists between South Africa and Botswana to manage 
the area as a single ecological unit.97 Forming a legal link between the watercourse treaties and 
existing institutions for cooperation at the transnational yet local level may provide 
opportunities for joint management of TBA hotspots which, like the Guarani Aquifer, have 
more urgent pressures to address. Where institutions do not yet exist, µFULWLFDODUHDV¶DQGWKH
development of local institutions may be a useful consideration for TBA governance in the 
SADC region. 
 
COMPARING APPLES AND ORANGES? 
 
We now reflect upon the utility of a comparative assessment of this nature. In light of the above 
analysis, we consider two questions. First, we investigate the long-standing debate of 
comparing apples and oranges, by inquiring into whether it is even possible to compare the 
legal regimes of transboundary aquifers, given their unique characteristics affecting regulatory 
priorities. Second, we contemplate the little-tested approach of comparing an existing 
international legal instrument with something that is essentially non-existent. We conclude that 
such an analysis can be conducted and replicated in other cases, as long as the purpose of the 
exercise is appreciated as a process of knowledge acquisition. 
 
TOO MANY VARIABLES: A FRUITLESS ANALYSIS? 
 
A long-standing debate in comparative legal scholarship poses the question of whether you can 
compare legal systems that are radically different.98 Comparative lawyers have traditionally 
avoided such comparisons, including that of non-State law, on account of their 
incomparability.99 Not only does the above analysis develop the scholarly trend of comparing 
regional legal systems,100 it compares legal systems that aim to regulate a subject matter (that 
is, transboundary aquifers) that is unique in each case, through both space and time: not only 
is no aquifer the same, their geology and hydrological processes change over time. This unique 
subject is then placed in an equally diverse political and cultural context, risking a potentially 
µIUXLWOHVV¶FRPSDULVRQ101 On what basis, then, can comparisons be drawn between two case 
studies with so many variables? 
 
In answering this question it is useful to consider the purpose of comparative law at the 
international level, which is often said to be the unification of law.102 As the world becomes 
LQFUHDVLQJO\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGFRQFHSWVVXFKµWUDQVQDWLRQDOJRYHUQDQFH¶HPSKDVL]HDQHHGWREH
LQIRUPHGE\WKHXQGHUSLQQLQJOHJDOV\VWHPVRIQDWLRQV6LPLODUO\LQRUGHUWRUHDFKµWKHEHVW
GHFLVLRQ¶LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOQHJRWLDWLRQVWKHUe is value in assessing existing models, which can 
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 form the basis of new international agreements.103 Comparative law is also said to be relevant 
for sources of public international law in its connection with identifying customary 
international law,104 or creating a basis for interpretation in the International Court of Justice. 
In these cases, not only is the comparison of radically different legal systems beneficial, it is 
LPSHUDWLYHWRDYRLGWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIQRWLRQVRIµXQLYHUVDO¶ODZDQGYDOXHVWKDWDUHSrimarily 
rooted in Western/European legal tradition, and are thus not applicable to other legal 
cultures.105 
 
The applicability of international legal principles in regional and national legal systems is 
considered in the above analysis. For example, the significance of the sovereignty principle in 
the Guarani Aquifer Agreement directly relates to the surrounding geopolitical context, where 
intrusions of national sovereignty are resisted by States in response to civil society concerns. 
There are weaker references to sovereignty in existing SADC regional policy and surface water 
agreements, which may suggest that national sovereignty concerns in relation to water 
resources are not necessarily replicated in the SADC. This is partly demonstrated through the 
less resistant attitudes towards international donors, as highlighted above. Thus, comparing 
radically different systems can test the flexibility of international legal frameworks when 
applied to different regional contexts. With the General Assembly due to decide the fate of the 
81,/&¶V'UDIW$UWLFOHVLQ106 such an observation about the controversial sovereignty 
provision could have significant implications for the development of these rules in the future. 
This article can accordingly form the basis for future research examining this principle in more 
depth, with reference to other regional approaches. 
 
The merits of the analysis carried out here do not necessarily reside in its ability to produce 
policy impacts, as the radical differences between aquifers, regional geopolitics and regional 
legal systems should be clear. However, identifying the unique and specific characteristics of 
aquifer systems and their associated legal rules can be of help to the international and/or 
transboundary lawmaking process. This is important, since framework agreements must be 
flexible in their application to different and varying contexts 7KLV DUWLFOH¶V FRPSDUDWLYH
analysis has identified the existing legal infrastructure that can enable implementation in both 
regions, the socio-economic activities surrounding aquifer use, the populations dependent on 
the aquifer, as well as the geopolitical context that can affect political will. The importance of 
investigating certain characteristics and different uses may not be appreciated when looking 
solely at one aquifer system and its surrounding legal structures. This article therefore 
demonstrates that the benefit of comparing apples and oranges is the process of the comparison 
itself, as opposed to any direct conclusions that can be drawn for one particular legal system. 
As Zweigert and Kötz suggest, like any other science, the aim of comparative law is generating 
knowledge.107 
 
A MEANS TO AN END? 
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 The second feature of this analysis is the little-tested approach of comparing an existing 
aquifer-specific international legal instrument with something that is apparently non-existent. 
It follows that this analysis could help inform the development of law governing transboundary 
aquifers in the SADC region, through drawing lessons from the agreement reached in the 
Guarani Aquifer System. This method presumes that an effective policy approach is to 
µWUDQVSODQW¶RQH OHJDOV\VWHPWRDQRWKHU108 However, the previous section demonstrates the 
uselessness of a legal transplant in this context. The differing climatic conditions and 
SRSXODWLRQVµVHUYHG¶E\WKHDTXLIHUs alone warrant a different type of regulatory attention. 
 
Accordingly, the utility of the above comparative analysis lies in distinguishing the two 
systems by looking at the underpinning legal instruments. While no bilateral or multilateral 
agreement specific to any aquifer currently exists in the SADC, there are several existing 
transboundary surface water agreements that could have a mandate to also cover TBAs, as we 
have seen with the ORASECOM and LIMCOM treaties. Thus, it may be erroneous to assume 
that no legal regime exists at all for TBAs in regions where aquifer-specific agreements are 
absent. However, we have also seen that the existing mandate can be very weak, and that in 
any case the existing international legal instruments in the SADC region that could cater for 
TBAs are geared almost entirely for the management of transboundary surface water. 
Nevertheless, existing institutional structures can serve as a foundation from which to build 
regulatory cooperation on shared aquifer systems. The process of comparing an existing treaty 
with a non-existent treaty undertaken in this article allows a departure from the increasingly 
rejected State-centric approach to comparative, and international law, by appreciating the 
institutional processes on different levels. This can produce a richer analysis and also help put 
the comparison in the correct geopolitical and cultural context. Again, it is the process of the 




This article has sought to address the question of whether apples and oranges can be compared 
in international environmental law. By apples and oranges we mean two international legal 
instruments placed in contexts that are so different that they usually would not be compared. 
In this case, the comparative exercise is complicated further since it takes place between an 
existing (albeit not yet in force) international legal instrument, the Guarani Aquifer Agreement, 
and a missing one for the management of transboundary aquifers in the SADC. 
 
We have argued that a comparative exercise of this nature is indeed possible, as long as its goal 
is not to highlight a management practice that could be considered as a model for another 
setting. The comparative exercise can be valuable if it is constructed as knowledge sharing 
between one region that has gained experience with a certain management practice and another 
region that has yet to gain such experience. In the comparative exercise undertaken in this 
article, we have identified several trends arising from the management of the Guarani Aquifer 
System that could be worth sharing with SADC countries currently embarking on the initial 
stages of the management of a TBA. Specifically, the lessons worth sharing include adapting 
the institutional setting based on pre-existing transboundary surface water treaties and the 
combination of both general and very specific provisions, and including the identification of 
µFULWLFDODUHDV¶IRUORFDOL]HGFRRSHUDWLRQDWWKHERUGHU. In particular, the practice that an ad hoc 
treaty (the Guarani Aquifer Agreement) has identified an already established transboundary 
surface water treaty system (the River Plate Basin treaty) as the management platform for the 
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 TBA is of particular interest. A similar pattern could emerge for two TBAs in the SADC region 
that are currently being studied in the framework of ongoing international projects. The 
responsibility for management of the Stampriet and Ramotswa aquifers could be assigned to 
the ORASECOM and LIMCOM, respectively,. In addition, a multi-level approach may address 
the challenges associated with the absence of an ad hoc adversarial dispute settlement system, 
although this issue requires further research. 
 
In conclusion, a comparative analysis of international environmental law should not shy away 
from difficult and unorthodox comparisons, although it should not be expected to produce law 
and policy recommendations. Comparing the Guarani Aquifer Agreement to the range of 
institutions potentially applicable to TBAs in the SADC region can be a useful exercise only if 
those undertaking the comparison are aware of its limits. The comparison serves primarily to 
generate and share knowledge. The experience in the Guarani Aquifer System region can be 
shared with those stakeholders and policy makers who are interested in promoting further TBA 
management in the SADC. However, lessons learnt from the Guarani Aquifer System 
management experience need to be carefully understood against the specific geopolitical and 
socio-economic context of Latin America. Comparative analysis of legal instruments for 
transboundary aquifers across regions thus serves as an explorative exercise to increase the 
knowledge base needed to advance this highly underdeveloped area. This is imperative for the 
upcoming discussions regarding the future for transboundary aquifer law, which are gaining 
momentum at the international level. 
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